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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL WELFARE: A PERSPECTIVE
Christopher Rhoades Dykema,
Student, Hunter College School
of Social Work
Part I, Introductory
The social services are in trouble. After decades of ex-
pansion, we face retrenchment, fiscal pressures that threaten vital
services, and unemployment among social service workers. The human
services' traditional political champions offer only a timid and
unconvinced resistance to the assaults from reactionary quarters.
This threatening environment is certainly disconcerting and
doubly so because it follows a period when the steady growth which
began with the progressive movement seemed to suddenly burgeon.
Money was abundant, agencies proliferated, and there seemed to be
a widespread public recognition of the need for an ever-increasing
program of services.
But now the mood of optimism has vanished. Workers and con-
sumers are scrambling to save some services from the fiscal wreck-
age. The mass media report a supposed reversal of public opinion
-- a new feeling that the social services have "failed," that they
are a senseless drain on the public treasury.
Clearly we are entering new and very trying times. But the
problems the social services are committed to addressing still ex-
ist and in some ways are getting worse. What has changed? It is
not enough to point to the new unpopularity of services. Everybody
knows social welfare has a public relations problem and besides,
this knowledge alone does not suggest any very new and more effect-
ive ways to fight for services or mount a counterattack against our
antagonists. Traditionally the proponents of social services have
lobbied for them on the basis that they were a rational way of
addressing certain social problems. Suddenly, despite the persist-
ence of the problems, the arguments seem inadequate. Examining
some aspects of the history of social welfare, this article will
show that social welfare's function has changed fundamentally in
ways that have altered,and (temporarily, we hope) reduced its base
of actual political support.
But what is social welfare's function? This is a matter of
-439-
long-standing dispute. The definition offered here is an attempt
at concreteness and clarity. Hopefully its usefulness will become
apparent in the course of the paper.
Social welfare in the modern United States is an aspect of
the legitimation and accumulation functions of government. It is
legitimative in that it works to ameliorate the economy's disast-
rous human consequences. It fulfills the accumulation function by
maintaining and enhancing conditions for the profitable conduct of
commerce.1 These two basic functions can obviously be discharged
in various ways and the social service worker's traditional commit-
ment has co-existed with greater and lesser degrees of contentment
with the nature of the existing society. Conscientious workers
have always recognized that their role -- as mediators between indi-
viduals and organized society -- necessarily involves ambiguities.
Certain "radical" writers of recent years have revealed a primitive
political understanding by identifying social services entirely
with the more repressive aspects of the legitimation function,
particularly in the area of relief. As we shall see, the matter is
not as simple as their diatribes would imply, but they have recog-
nized an important issue. Relief has traditionally been the cru-
cial social welfare service, to which all others are politically
(and, often, administratively) allied. In recent decades, the poli-
tical economy of American social welfare has eveolved in close con-
junction with the development of relief and has largely reflected
changes in the nature of poverty itself. This analysis must, there-
fore, begin with a look at the economic and political forces that
have formed the basis of the existing American social welfare system.
Part II, Traditional Social Welfare in Maturity
Social welfare assumed its modern form in the thirties when
the Depression had disrupted most aspects of American life and many
elements in society jockeyed for position and influence. The most
significant contenders eventually arrived at a set of mutually accept-
able compromises. One of these arrangements, important to several
key groups, was the development of the social welfare system.
Some of the history of these events appears in Frances Fox
Piven and Richard Cloward's Regulating the Poor, The Functions of
Public Welfare.2 Although they refer in passing to the Speenhamland
system and other earlier experiences their conclusions are mainly
based on a study of relief in the United States since the advent of
the Depression, during the historical epoch of modern American public
assistance. From this analysis they construct a general theory of
the function of welfare. Briefly, they argue that relief serves to
assure the availability of a large pool of cheap labor (the accumu-
lation function), that relief is given in a manner calculated to
-440-
enforce passivity in the workforce (the legitimation function), and
that relief administrators, historically, have vacilated between a
hard and a soft approach according to the manpower needs of the
ruling social strata.
Their analysis is largely valid as far as it goes, and dis-
cussions of social welfare cannot safely fail to use it as a point
of departure. However, Piven and Cloward, concentrating on the
labor force, ignore the evolution of the broader political economy,
a process which forms the basis of all major developments in social
welfare.
The Depression, for instance, was more than just a disrup-
tion -- even though a gigantic one -- in the progress of the labor
force. In fact it marked a profound change in the American politi-
cal economy. Up until then the economy had been able, albeit with
mounting difficulty, to generate enough demand to absorb what in-
dustry produced. In the past there had been recurrent failures of
this absorption process but these downturns in the business cycle,
"panics" as our grandparents quaintly called them, had a serious
but still only limited effect. The mass layoffs they occasioned
would increase competition for jobs and would lower wage levels.
At a certain point wage costs would have declined enough for busi-
ness to see an advantage in expanding operations once again and
hiring the jobless. A recovery would begin. Prosperity would
bloom, unemployment would fall and the resulting competition among
employers for the now-scarce workers would gradually raise wages to
the point of cutting into profitability. Then there would be another
panic and the cycle would repeat itself. This abstract schema is a
general paradigm for the movements of the American economy in the
period separating the Civil War and the Depression.
This simple pattern, however, was complicated by business-
men's constant effort to improve their profitability by replacing
workers with an increasingly sophisticated technolocy. Their
scrambling for an edge in competition made for an accelerating ten-
dency towards chronic technological unemployment. The unprecedented
severity of the cyclical downturn which began in the fall of 1929,
occurred mainly because the economy had finally reached a point where
fewer and fewer workers could produce more and more commodities. It
was no longer realistic to assume that the recovery would naturally
happen all by itself. By 1933 this fact was so strikingly obvious
that the Roosevelt administration was forced by circumstances to
intervene actively in most aspects of the economy. By the Federal
Emergency Relief Act of May 12, 1933, the labor force was included
in this intervention.
-441-
As the Depression deepened, relief continued in a variety of
forms, including both the dole and several explicit and implicit
types of work relief. Nearly every social element was for it in
one form or another. Businessmen supported it, 4 although they came
to think work relief less debilitating to the work ethic than the
dole. The hordes of jobless were certainly in favor. In fact,
their efforts were a significant element in the general insurgency
of the period. Organized under leftist leadership into the Workers'
Alliance of America, an early example of Popular Front cooperation,
they fought for adequate relief and, to an extentwere successful.5
The disruptions caused by the Workers' Alliance, however,
would have been politically insignificant without the concurrent
strike wave among the employed. The number of man-days lost to
strikes rose from a low of 3,320,000 in 1930 to 19,600,000 in 1934.6
Such serious disruptions of business activity could only be avoided
with cooperation from the employees, and the reforms advanced by
the New Deal were part of an effort to secure the acquiescence of
a crucial part of the working class in forming a renovated capital-
ist social order.
This renovated social order, as one of its architects writes,
. . began to assume its present form as a result of the crisis
of 1933. Under stress of the Great Depression . . . the federal
government assumed responsibility for the functioning of the eco-
nomic system"7 In the past, laisser faire theory had held that
government should discharge the legitimation function in a small
way (providing police forces and armies when necessary) and that
market mechanisms would pretty much take care of the problems of
accumulation. But the Depression was solid evidence that the market
could no longer be trusted to do any such thing. It was just this
failure that made renovation of the social order so necessary and
also showed that the key to the renovation lay in finding a way to
create enough demand to support a reasonable level of production.
The Roosevelt administration initiated various mechanisms
of economic stimulation which were not very successful -- full em-
ployment was only achieved with the beginning of war production.
But the New Deal reforms were not simply irrelevant. However
limited their success in generating economic recovery, they did
succeed in establishing a social order which is only now beginning
to disintegrate. The social welfare system was an important ele-
ment in this new arrangement. Its establishment reflected the
political dynamics of the time, a relationship of political forces
which we must examine.
In the thirties, as in the present, American society was
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dominated by its business elite. But the American business community
falls into two parts: the monopoly sector and the competitive sec-
tor.8 The former comprises the largest corporations, including most
basic manufacturing and mining; the latter comprises all other com-
mercial enterprises. However, petty entrepreneurs like small shop-
keepers, newsdealers, etc., are nearly powerless at a national level.
In practice the competitive sector may, therefore, be taken to include
only those secondary industries and smaller enterprises whose owner-
ship is so dispersed and the scope of whose operations so local that
they relate to each other and the consumer on the basis of the tra-
ditional mechanism of price competition.
The monopolistic corporation, by contrast, dominates its mar-
ket either alone or in cooperation with a limited number of similar
corporations.9 It is not subject to price competition because the
major corporations set their prices on the basis of formal or infor-
mal mutual collusion.
Relations between the sectors have never been static and, in
fact, the conflict between them has often been bitter. It arose a
century ago with the advent of the first corporations, giants seek-
ing to become monopolies. Since the competitive mechanism progress-
ively eliminates the weaker firms (except in special cases), there
is a natural tendency for the ownership of industry to become more
concentrated.10 The eventual outcome of the conflict between large
and small capital could then hardly be in doubt. The Depression,
however, accelerated the process, profoundly weakening competitive
capital.
The New Deal consolidated the monopoly sector's hegemony.
The competitive sector retains some constantly shrinking areas of
power -- Congress is perhaps the most significant -- but the mono-
poly sector has maintained effective control of the national admin-
istration since 1933.11 Congress had had only marginal influence
over the budgetary process since 1920,12 and so the federal inter-
vention in the economy inaugurated by the New Deal must thus be
seen as a fairly exclusive project of the newly ascendant monopoly
sector. It is true, of course, that public relief and the other
New Deal reforms are often imagined to have been enacted over the
furious opposition of business. This is a simplistic and incorrect
view. To be sure, many businessmen did oppose the reforms, and
their opinions were widely disseminated by organizations like the
National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce.
However, these are the very groups which most clearly ". . . reflect
conservative elements within the power elite and represent their
short run interests in specific geographical areas."13 This is
competitive capital at work. By contrast, the monopolistic
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. . . corporation has a longer time horizon and it is a more
rational calculator. Both differences are related to the incompar-
ably larger scale of the corporation's operations."14 This broader
perspective is also more liberal -- the monopolistic corporation,
until recently, could afford to make concessions to labor and gener-
ally meet the needs of the underlying population, allowing greater
attention to government's legitimation function. The competitive
businessman, struggling to survive from day to day or at least from
year to year, tends to believe that the government should guarantee
accumulation and do no more.
Not surprisingly, the leaders of the monopoly sector worked
for the reformist social legislation which began in the Progressive
Era and culminated in the New Deal. The overt pressure for the re-
forms generally came from labor and other popular forces but the
powerful influence of big capital was constantly present in such
organizations as the National Civic Federation, a group of major
business leaders and conservative trade unionists, and the American
Association for Labor Legislation, a prototypical think tank of
liberal intellectuals financed by corporate leaders. The National
Association of Manufacturers on the other hand, was an organization
which, according to the NCF's President and founder, Ralph Easley,
.. . . 'included none of the great employers representing the basic
industries, such as coal, iron and steel, building trades and
railroads.'"15 The dissension on social questions between these
two industrial strata had taken on a developed form as early as
1905 when leaders of the NCF intervened on the side of the Metal
Polishers Union and the American Federation of Labor in the Buck's
Stove and Range Case, an anti-labor court action brought by Jazes
W. Van Cleave, a leader of the National Association of Manufacturers.
In this case, Andrew Carnegie surreptitiously subsidized the legal
defense of the MPU and AFL which was conducted by Alton B. Parker,
a Wall Street lawyer, Presidential candidate in 1904 and future NCF
President.16
This political technique -- covert support by the monopolistic
corporate elite for measures advanced by mass reform movements --
persisted into the thirties and still exists. It was employed, with
conspicuous success, in the fight for the social reforms of the New
Deal, particularly the two crucial enactments, the Wagner National
Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act. The Wagner Act
established an assured, though subordinate position for the organi-
zed working class in the renovated capitalist polity. The explicit
purpose of the Act was ". . . to diminish the causes of labor dis-
putes burdening or obstructing . . . commerce. . . ." But it was
not enough to give labor a voice. It was also necessary to address
some real grievances of the working population. Hence, the Social
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Security Act of 1935 established unemployment compensation, social in-
surance, and public assistance. It was an obvious and direct response
to the mass unemployment of the Depression, an implicit recognition
that the market mechanism and private social agencies could no longer
deal with the problems of chronic joblessness. It was also the cul-
mination of years of lobbying and agitation by popular groups like
the Townsend Movement and the labor movement and also by elite groups
like the American Association for Labor Legislation.
Both the Wagner Act and the Social Security Act are corner-
stones of the existing social order. They grew out of political
struggle and reflected the balance of forces at the time of their
passage -- the leaders of the monopoly sector were consolidating
their newly-won ascendancy in the midst of economic collapse. To do
this they needed a measure of social tranquility at a time when the
working class had reached an unprecedented level of organization
and militancy and could only be repressed by armed violence. Intelli-
gent leaders of the monopoly sector did not imagine, however, that
the labor struggles constituted a revolutionary situation. After
all, the better-informed among them probably knew that the Communist
Party, the most significant radical organization of the period, had
found little success in the uncompromisingly revolutionary policy
it followed from 1928 to 1934.18 The two acts were passed not to
head off revolution but to acknowledge that a tranquil environment
for the conduct of business and the renovation of the social order
was impossible without some attention to the needs of the workforce.
The social order formed by the renovation of the thirties
still exists and has come to be called the liberal corporate state.
It is liberal by contrast with laisser faire, which had prevailed
earlier.19 It is corporate in t-at the giant corporation is its
dominant economic unit. And within this social order the govern-
ment has assumed a broad range of economic responsibilities. In
fact, the Federal Government has become, in large part, an adminis-
trative device which uses a repertoire of techniques to guarantee,
as much as possible, the smooth functioning of the economy. This,
in effect, means that government must maintain conditions which
guarantee the profitability of the major corporations. Preeminently,
the government creates demand by actually buying vast quantities
of industrial products. It acts to secure overseas markets and
generally tries to assure an open field for corporate activity
abroad. It pays for necessary research and development. It advances
capital to prevent disruptive bankruptcies. And, as we shall see,
it regulates the workforce.
Under laisser faire, of course, all these functions were
almost entirely private responsibilities since it was believed
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that the market would take care of the economy without intentional
human direction.
The Depression showed the inadequacy of laisser faire and
the need for conscious use of human intelligence in--Udressing the
problems not only of the economy per se but also of society in gen-
eral. Consequently corporate liberal-sm has a greater regard for
expertise than the laisser faire approach, which valued knowledge
and thought primarily when it was directly applicable to making
money. Corporate liberalism believes that economic and social prob-
lems have solutions which technical experts can formulate as poli-
cies. Not surprisingly, social work started to flourish with the
beginning of corporate liberal hegemony. As Walter Trattner says,
it ". . . assumed a new prestige and importance in American life as
a result of the Depression and the New Deal."20 Social workers had
important administrative positions in the Roosevelt administration
and in both public and private agencies their numbers doubled dur-
ing the thirties2l despite mass unemployment. It was one among
many forms of expertise that the emerging corporate liberal order
pressed into service in its effort to find technical solutions to
social problems.22
One of the first major projects of social workers in the
liberal corporate state was in designing the public assistance pro-
visions which formed an integral part of the Social Security Act.
And just as the hegemony of corporate liberalism was built on an
accommodation between various layers of society, so too the Social
Security Act was a product of compromise. The working class got
unemployment insurance, a basic national pension in OASI, a floor
under wages in the newly organized public relief system, and some
rudimentary social services. The corporate elite of the monopoly
sector got a systematized disciplinary mechanism in the relief sys-
tem which it could use in regulating the workforce. Some theorists
expected, however, that public assistance would be a residual pro-
gram, withering away as soon as OASI became thoroughly established.
This was a vain hope. War did bring temporary decline, but after
1945 relief expanded once more. "Once an economic convulsion sub-
sides and civil order is restored, relief systems are not ordinar-
ily abandoned."23 Although war production continued after 1945,
it was held at a level sufficient to maintain wartime employment
levels. Relief was institutionalized and ". . . made an important
contribution toward overcoming these persistent weaknesses in the
capacity of the market to direct and control men. "24 This was its
traditional discliplinary function, a function it has fulfilled,
using a very limited repertoire of techniques, since the decline of
feudalism. But an historic change was in the making.
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Part III, Traditional Social Welfare in Decline
In recent years the corporate liberal alliance for social
welfare has weakened and partially broken down. A fundamental
presupposition of the alliance was the availability of enough
wealth to fund social welfare services. A basic premise was social
welfare's regulatory function. Both of these necessary conditions
have been seriously undermined -- the one, by certain broad eco-
nomic trends, the other by profound demographic changes. These two
new factors have come to act in concert in recent years, since the
economic trends became apparent. The demographic changes emerged
somewhat less recently. Partly understood, they began to arouse
official concern in the early sixties.
Piven and Cloward25 offer a partially valid analysis of the
developments and their main point is correct: mechanization of
southern agriculture forced great numbers of blacks off the land.
(They ignore an analogous process which took place in Puerto Rico
with greater intentional viciousness and similar results.) Product-
ivity in cotton-growing increased 304% between 1950 and 1965, 26
transforming what had previously been a very labor-intensive indus-
try. An enormous unemployment rate developed in southern agricul-
tural labor.27 Millions of displaced farm workers left the country-
side and flocked into urban areas. The southern relief system, which
Piven and Cloward show to have exercised its traditional regulatory
function with exceptional harshness, continued as before.28 Great
numbers, therefore, came north and settled in a relatively small
number of cities.
In these areas the welfare systems were less restrictive than
in the South and the rolls began an inexorable expansion. By 1957
the Aid to Dependent Children category overtook Old Age Assistance
and became, permanently, the largest.29 By December, 1963 the costs,
in constant dollars, of public assistance had tripled over the level
of December, 1936. 30 Clearly, a significant proportion of these
migrants were not finding jobs and settling into the traditional
pattern of working class existence. Something had gone unprecedented-
ly wrong.
Rural populations have been leaving the land and coming to
cities for centuries, of course. This urbanization process has al-
ways involved massive dislocations and, frequently, great suffering,
but sooner or later, in times of prosperity, these populations were
absorbed into the labor force. During recessionary periods, of
course, they were often the first to suffer layoffs, but even so,
they did have at least some organic relation to the workforce. As
a result, most writers on the subject, and most politicians, see the
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question of relief as one of regulating labor, getting people to
work. Piven and Cloward only differ from the others in their more
systematic analysis and greater humanitarian concern for the clients.
But all these theorists, including Piven and Cloward, fail to grasp
that a new epoch has begun.
Most welfare recipients are not simply unemployed workers.
They are, in actuality, a kind of subproletariat3l whose exclusion
from the workforce does not significantly change with fluctuations
in the business cycle. The most basic reason for this change is the
increasingly technologicaland capital-intensive character of Ameri-
can industry.
Traditionally, urbanized rural people have gotten jobs re-
quiring little skill. This process has now broken down. The break-
down is a fairly recent phenomenon, corresponding, historically, to
the expansion of public assistance.32
This point may be empirically demonstrated. In the period
1950-1965, to use Piven and Cloward's periodization, the number of
non-farm laborers (a category to which displaced farm workers are
naturally recruited), only increased by an average of .6334% per
annum,33 far slower than the general labor force (1.28%)34 and the
U.S. population (1.84%).35
These figures do not depict a situation in which an unskilled
migrant from the Mississippi Delta could readily find a job, but
they assume an even greater importance if compared with equivalent
figures from the earlier period 1890-1950 when the labor force in-
creased significantly faster (3.42% per annum) 36 than the population
(2.34% per annum).37 In other words the economy now has a decreas-
ing capacity to absorb the natural increase of the whole population
into the workforce. Its ability to absorb the unskilled has become
negligible. They have truly become a superfluous population, rather
than a necessary surplus population.
The rise of the subproletariat has had profound consequences.
The presence of masses of black voters in northern cities created
a powerful interest group pressing the Democratic Party to secure
black rights in the South. This tended to detach the white South
from its traditional Democratic allegiance,39 and thus increased the
importance of urban voters, especially since many blacks came to be
concentrated in cities that are strategic in national elections.
In addition, not all the black and Latin migrants were voters.
Many congregated in the cities, alienated from the established elec-
toral political process. The political machines of these cities,
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dominated by the regional business elites of the competitive sector,
were not interested in organizing and politically integrating the new
ghetto population which was unlikely to support them reliably and,
if organized, might have worked against some of their local interests:
e.g., the urban renewal schemes of competitive business interests.
This, then, was the situation in 1961 which confronted John F.
Kennedy, a representative par excellence of the liberal corporate
elite of the monopoly sector. His party had largely lost its secure
political base in the South, and the narrowness of his victory in
1960 showed that the potential base among urban northern blacks was
not yet fully realized. And the local Democratic organizations would
not do much to remedy the situation. In addition, as the next few
years would show, the presence of such numbers of impoverished and
anomic people in northern cities was a potential source of serious
disruption. Kennedy, Johnson and their entourage were, therefore,
presented with a complicated set of problems. The situation was not
so grave as the crisis of the thirties -- it was not an economic
and social cataclysm requiring a full-scale renovation of the social
order -- but it was serious nonetheless and could not be addressed by
standard procedures.
The Democratic regime followed two distinct but related
approaches to the dilemma presented by the newly urbanized ghetto
population. The first, embodied in the 1962 Amendments to the
Social Security Act, was an attempt to get people off welfare by
providing rehabilitative services. The second, involving several
pieces of legislation, found its clearest expression in the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964.
The Economic Opportunity Act was a conscious attempt to con-
front the dilemma that the growth of the subproletariat posed for the
political and corporate leadership of the monopoly sector. This
point is beautifully demonstrated by the writings of Daniel P.
Moynihan,40 a participant in the preparations for the poverty pro-
gram. Moynihan describes the concerns of the program's architects
with some clarity. As an early poverty warrior he was ".
involved with . . . the situation of those persons in the population
whose life circumstances do not appear to respond, at least very
quickly, to the large movements in the economy." (i.e., the business
cycle) .41 The problem was becoming so serious that it could not be
overlooked. The economy ". . . seemed to be acquiring patterns
sharply inhospitable to the poor, notably the Negro poor fleeing the
depressed countryside."42 However, ". . . the poverty cycle was, at
this point, still seen almost solely in terms of the individual,"43
whose unemployability was thought to be a result of many cultural,
environmental and motivational factors acting in concert to produce
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a kind of vicious circle. (The economic side of the issue went
largely unnoticed.)
The War on Poverty was, therefore, conceived as a massive
exercise in environmental modification, ". . . 'a coordinated attack'
to break the cycle through preventive, rehabilitative and ameliora-
tive interventions."44 It included a large number of programs in
job-training, education, legal services, day-care, etc., and also
provided federal money for local groups to fund programs of their
own. To ". . ensure that persons excluded from the political pro-
cess in the South and elsewhere would nonetheless participate in
the benefits of the community action programs . . ."45 it required
that they be "'developed and conducted with the maximum feasible par-
ticipation of residents of the areas and members of the groups
served . . .'"46 This was a clear attempt to bypass the local
elites of the competitive sector, political forces which, of course,
had already failed to integrate the ghettoized subproletariat into
the established political process. The anticipation of a refractory
attitude on their part is an obvious echo of the controversy around
the Wagner and Social Security Acts.47 In fact, the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act, like its predecessors, was an example of enlightened
social legislation developed by liberal experts (of the Ford,
Russell Sage, and Kaplan Foundations)48 and supported on a federal
level by the political representatives of the monopoly sector. In
this sense it was a part of the traditional corporate strategy
traced earlier.
The War on Poverty, however, became a sad example of the
futility of mechanically applying a familiar response to a changed
set of circumstances. The crisis of the thirties, although very
serious, had been resolved by a combination of political compromise
and (eventually) massive and permanent military spending, policies
quite acceptable to the elites of the monopoly sector. The organi-
zed working class had thus been integrated through certain specific
concessions. Its loyalty in practice was assured. No such specific
measures suggested themselves in the sixties when it was clear that
something had to be done to integrate the subproletariat.
The existence of the subproletariat obviously demanded a
thorough re-ordering of the economy to create great numbers of jobs.
Such a reform, although indispensable, would have been much more far-
reaching than the concessions of 1935. It was, and is still, anti-
thetical to the corporate elite's interests and hence unacceptable
to them. Unable to really address the problem, the poverty warriors
could only offer vital but inadequate services, illusory "partici-
pation" and a surfeit of rhetoric.
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However, the Economic Opportunity Act was more than a mere
assemblage of noble thoughts. In fact, it raised vast hopes and
galvanized thousands of people into action, people who were organi-
zed with funds the Act had appropriated. Using a fairly small amount
of money (relative to the total federal budget), the poverty program
built a constituency. This constituency had a paid staff recruited
from the natural leadership of the communities. The staff's pay did
not, of course, come from the constituency itself and its account-
ability was therefore rather ambiguous.49 Even so, an internal poli-
tical structure had been brought into being, a structure with many
characteristics of a big-city machine of the type that had tradition-
ally integrated the urban working class into the American polity.
Some of the community action agencies' activities were dis-
ruptive but they were more of a nuisance to local politicians and
public assistance agencies than to the monopolistic elites. As
Moynihan shows,50 moreover, even local politicians learned to live
with community action which turned out to be less of a menace than
they had expected.
All this activity failed, of course, to achieve the osten-
sible purpose of the War on Poverty. This ostensible purpose, how-
ever, was not a mere trivial obfuscation without social significance.
It presupposed that certain services would change poor populations
in ways that would move them toward self-support. A similar theory,
on an individual level, informed the 1962 Amendments to the Social
Security Act. The one approach' was based on the rehabilitation of
whole populations, the other of individuals. Although poor people
do need many services, both as communities and as individuals, in
their struggle for survival, it is also clear that success must
forever elude any rehabilitative effort which aims "To move people
off relief by renewing their spirit and creating economic and social
opportunities for them, "51 when the entire emphasis is on the "spirit"
and there is no serious effort to create anything like a sufficient
number of jobs.
This extravagant rhetoric and vacuous content smacks clearly
of a hidden purpose. In the case of the 1962 service amendments,
however, the political ulterior motive is not as obvious as it was
in the case of the war on poverty. Part of the reason probably is
that the service program was designed by competent social workers in
the Ad Hoc Committee on Public Welfare who certainly understood
client needs.52 Unfortunately they also felt obliged to promise that
services would materially reduce the welfare rolls by rehabilitating
the clients. This promise was used to justify creating the begin-
nings of a comprehensive social service network, somethincr Americans
desperately need. Unfortunately, it depended on borrowed political
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capital that could not be repaid. Since the rehabilitative effort
could not possibly show any very satisfactory results in employment,
there began to be political criticisms.53
As the sixties continued, the welfare system came to be seen
as an increasingly serious failure. Recipients and their sympathizers
damned it as a dehumanizing quagmire which provided grossly inade-
quate benefits. Much "public opinion" and its representative polit-
icians bewailed the mounting expense. Both had a strong factual
basis for their discontent. All the agitation of the War on Poverty
had not created substantially higher grant levels. It had, however,
played a role in the dramatic expansion of the rolls which grew,
nationally, by 107% from 1960 to 1969. 54 A large part of the increase
came even after the industrial boom of the Vietnam War began in 1965,
further evidence for the existence of a mass subproletariat.
Piven and Cloward, who were deeply involved in the welfare
rights movement, see the explosion of the welfare rolls as the re-
sult of three factors: the rise of community action agencies offer-
ing advocacy services, the setting up of legal services agencies
which fought for recipients' legal rights, and the mobilizing of
people in poor areas by community organization.55 They demonstrate
that all these elements were the result of federal action and that
although there was no particular popular demand for them before
their establishment56 they very quickly generated an enthusiastic
response from the impoverished populations which received the serv-
ices. The response, as we have seen, was quite in keeping with the
interests of the monopoly sector and the Democratic Party on a
national level -- the subproletariat began to be integrated into
the established political process. However, it was not enough to
organize this group and given it a voice. Even in the paternalis-
tic context of the poverty program, certain expectations were raised,
expectations which had to be met in some way.
The simplest and most readily available palliative was welfare,
which expanded at a furious rate. The great majority of new appli-
cants had been eligible for some time.57 What had changed was the
ease with which their cases were accepted. Any person who worked in
a public assistance agency in the later sixties was aware of the
loosening eligibility standards, typified by the fact that a certain
acceptance code was used in those years by the New York City Depart-
ment of Welfare to designate cases which had become eligible through
liberalization of agency policy.58 Significantly, no code existed
to fit a hypothetical opposite circumstance.
The expansion of welfare, however, could not fail to call
forth a reaction. In some localities the local share of public
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assistance was beginning to be a fiscal burden, resulting in rising
taxes, a source of discontent among the working population whose de-
clining living standard did not increase their receptivity to rising
welfare outlays.59
But the core of opposition to welfare was the local competit-
ive sector business elites, who had always disapproved of relief and
now had a certain mass following for their campaign against the
"welfare mess. "
Welfare's legislative defenders were in a dilemma. In 1962
they had enacted the service amendments. A few years later they had
set up the poverty program. But poverty continued to exist and pub-
lic assistance seemed to grow with no end in sight.
None of this is entirely surprising. The subproletariat
could only have been employed with a major and very expensive
effort at job creation and retraining. This would have required
redistribution of wealth or a significant reduction in military
spending or both. These solutions were politically tabu and so the
legislative response followed the tradition of imposing work require-
ments on the recipient, setting up the "Vork Incentive Program" (WIN)
60. Since this did not address the problem of job availability any
more than earlier efforts, it must be viewed as a self-indulgent act
of legislative petulance.
Attempts to enforce the work ethic on the subproletariat are
essentially ideological exercises. But not all politicians are a
prey to such illusions. After all, as we have seen, the declining
ability of the labor market to absorb the potentially employable
can be demonstrated with non-esoteric figures from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Not surprisingly, some changes in public policy
seem to signal the beginning of a new approach to relief.
Perhaps the most important of these changes is the adminis-
trative separation of social services from financial assistance, a
clear break with the 1962 service amendments which had assumed that
each recipient was employable unless proved otherwise. Separation
implies an opposite assumption, relegating non-financial services to
a relatively limited role and introducing the concent of "income
maintenance" with its connotations of permanent dependency. To be
sure, some authorities have envisioned separation as enhancing serv-
ices (i.e., the accumulation function). "Why not," wrote Gordon
Hamilton in an early statement of this theme, "take the albatross
of 'relief' from the neck of social service?"61 This kind of thinking
was current in many circles during the sixties. Why, it was asked,
does one need a social worker just because one happend to be poor?
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The abstract logic of these ideas is impeccable. Unfortunately,
they have served, in practice, to give a propagandistic cover to the
crippling of services.
Separation, under federal mandate, prevailed in most of the
country by the early seventies. Its practical meaning quickly be-
came apparent. One of its first victims was the insurgency of re-
lief recipients that had seemed so powerful in the sixties. The kind
of bureaucratic flexibility that the National Welfare Rights Organi-
zation had exploited (by demanding clothing and other discretionary
special grants) is gone now and NWRO declined to the point that it
was destroyed in 1973 by the National Caucus of Labor Committees.62
The public assistance rolls remain high, however, and it seems im-
possible to reduce them to anything like the levels prevailing before
1960 or 1965.
The welfare system, in practice, seems now to be moving towards
being a custodial operation. It sustains life, minimally, to avoid
the kind of mass starvation prevalent in underdeveloped countries.
And it gives relief in a way that induces atomization and passivity.
The custodial concept is not publicly acknowledged, of course, and
indeed it is anathema to all politicians and much of the electorate.
They do not realize yet that an epochal change has taken place, that
for the first time since the decline of feudalism, there is a large
and permanent subproletariat with no realistic prospect of absorp-
tion into the workforce. The custodial concept tacitly recognizes
this historic fact. But since the concept has not yet been elabora-
ted coherently by any of the theoreticians of public policy, one can
only guess about the eventual mature form they will give it.
The development of the subproletariat and, derivatively, of
the custodial principle, imply, most significantly, that the tradi-
tional function of relief as the disciplinarian of the workforce,
has been eliminated, at least potentially. After all, the disciplin-
ary function presupposes that the recipients, or at least the able-
bodied among them, are members of the workforce who happen, moment-
arily, to be jobless. But events of the sixties clearly show that
relief can expand even in boom times, irrespective of cyclical fluc-
tuations in employment. Hence it is clear that most public assist-
ance clients, not belonging to the workforce, can hardly be subject
to its discipline. To this extent, then, it may be said that Piven
and Cloward, the chroniclers of the disciplinary function, are
obsolete.
There is, however, yet another development which confuses
this whole issue. Just at the point when the development of the
economy had created a permanent subproletariat, apart from the
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labor force, it also entered a period of chronic stagnation and high
unemployment, factors which tend to blur the distinction between the
subproletariat and the more or less steadily employed workforce whose
recurrent joblessness is still the result of cyclical changes. This
working-class stratum has often belonged to the mass following of the
anti-welfare demogogy of recent years. Now such people frequently
find themselves receiving public assistance or, even more often, food
stamps and unemployment insurance. This experience probably tends to
alter their view of relief, but just as important, their obviously
involuntary unemployment vitiates the argument that welfare clients
are really shiftless loafers. How long this situation will continue
is uncertain. The immediate result partly depends on the vicissitudes
of party politics. However, the economic recovery now in progress
has shown itself to be compatible with a level of officially reported
unemployment so high that President Ford's spokesmen have resorted to
vilification of his own Bureau of Labor Statistics.63 Unemployment
in the workforce is likely to be high for the foreseeable future.
The persistence of this joblessness, although a human tragedy,
does at least have the potential merit of uniting in suffering the
somewhat more regularly employed portion of the population with the
subproletariat. An alliance of these two elements is the only poss-
ible basis for political resistance to the attack on the American
living standard, a resistance which becomes more and more crucial
all the time as the corporate liberal polity deteriorates.
The liberal corporate state, as we have seen, was founded on
a number of compromises among social groups. The initial arrange-
ments were the key legislative enactments of the mid-thirties. World
War II brought national unity and prosperity, perpetuated in the later
forties by the permanent war economy and political/economic domina-
tion of the rest of the world. This was a key accommodation. In
effect, the corporate elite guaranteed the working population a ris-
ing living standard which formed the basis for integration of every
social element into the corporate liberal social order. In the fif-
ties social scientists celebrated the "end of ideology" and proclaim-
ed that the material basis for social conflict had vanished in the
United States, a nation in which nearly everybody was "middle class."
This conception of American reality was wildly exaggerated,
of course, but it was true that the general living standard improved
steadily enough that most Americans came to see continued improvement
as an inalienable right of citizenship. In fact, this "right" ex-
isted only as long as the corporate elite could afford it. To be
sure, they could afford it for two decades, but they cannot afford
it any more. Hence, they have taken steps to protect their own fi-
nancial position at the expense of almost everyone else. The Vietnam
War stimulated business activity and as a result the living standard
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declined only gradually for awhile.59 The war is over now, however,
and in recent years the American living standard has come under heavy
attack from the business community.
In the social services we are painfully familiar with this cor-
porate assault, which has taken the form of budgetary restrictions
in the name of fiscal responsibility. Although there is a wide vari-
ety of ideological justifications for the attack on social welfare,
most of them are rationalizations of fiscal pressures imposed by the
centers of corporate and financial power. In some cases this power
has been used quite openly, as in New York City, where an ultimatum
from a well-organized group of banks forced the local government to
yield control of the city administration to a board of financiers and
corporate executives.
Nationally the corporate pressures have been more casual and
covert. Still, the business press grows steadily more frenzied in
proclaiming a "crisis in capital formation." Business Week,64 for
example, recently published a special issue with the banner headline:
"Capital Crisis: The $4.5 trillion America Needs to Grow." Other
publications have sounded the same theme in recent months. The gist
of their argument is that:
The jaws that threaten the nation's well-being are not
those on the giant fish that loom up in front of movie-
goers, but those on the yawning capital gap that faces
the U.S. this year and as far ahead as anyone can see.65
The shortage of investment capital, they believe, is so serious as
to preclude further expansion of Ametican industry. Their solutions
include: reductions in government spending to release capital for
corporate use, changes in the tax structure ". . . so that the cash
flow to business increases,"66 and other changes in public policy
to benefit corporate interests. They acknowledge that "there is a
problem in that any tax break for businesses comes on as a business
welfare program while businessmen are not perceived by the general
public as among the deserving poor."67 Unpopular though it may be,
however, a diminished living standard for most Americans is, they
believe, the only solution. Business, which used to exhort us to
increasing consumption, has been taken with an almost Calvinistic
austerity and believes us to be ". . . a society that is too pro-
fligate in consuming rather than saving. . .. "68
Social service workers, long used to working with insufficient
resources among the desperately poor, may not recognize "profligacy"
as a universal characteristic of American society. They may even
imagine that the "crisis in capital formation" is dnly a propagandistic
deception. There is indeed a large measure of press agentry in
Business Week's florid language. Unfortunately, there is also enough
reality to constitute a serious strategic problem for those who wish
to preserve and extend the social services. It is the reality of the
American political economy's essential irrationality, a system which
can only avoid collapse by institutionalizing waste, war, and point-
less destruction. Recognizing this fact, however, does not diminish
the problem although we are not constrained by any inherent logic to
accept Business Week's solutions.
It is true that money capital is relatively scarce, interest
rates are high, and that great numbers of businesses are so deeply
in debt that they constantly borrow to pay off their obligations.
This is the reason for the calls of corporate spokesmen for govern-
ment retrenchment, calls which find political echoes in the Baptist
and Buddhist rhetoric of Jimmy Carter and Governor Brown.
The shortage of liquid capital would seem to be a purely eco-
nomic problem, far removed from our concerns, and yet it is the basis
for social welfare's most menacing political opposition. It is vital,
therefore, to understand its origins in order to develop a strategy
for social welfare.
The shortage developed slowly, reachina serious proportions
only recently. Its roots, however, are in the corporate liberal re-
sponse to the Depression, a crisis which, as shown earlier, arose out
of the market's inability to absorb the products of industry. In the
forties the government became the "consumer of last resort," buying
war materiel to keep the economy going at a high level of prosperity.
Although parts of Asia and Europe slipped from its grasp, the United
States had emerged from the war as the dominant world power. Its
military, despite a partial demobilization, was maintained tc assure,
among other things, that the "Free World" would be a secure market
for American industry. Militarism, therefore, developed two import-
ant economic functions: in itself it consumed vast quantities of
industrial products, and it enforced their consumption by people in
other countries.
Military spending could not be financed entirely out of taxes.
As a result, the Federal budget has been in deficit almost every year
since the beginning of World War II. Economists at first believed
that deficits were a healthy economic stimulus. More recently, how-
ever, deficits have become a source of concern, seen as inflationary.
And the economists are right after all. When Washington spends more
money than it receives in taxes it makes up the difference by selling
bonds, notes and similar instruments. Banks and corporations buy
most of this paper which can then be used in their transactions just
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like ordinary currency. The total supply of dollars in circulation
increases and is far greater than the gold reserves which supposedly
back it.
Inflation is in fact just that -- a situation in which growth
of the money supply outruns the grow-l of commodities (gold is only
a specialized commodity, after all).
Deficit spending at home and economic expansion abroad became
a fairly consistent Federal policy. For years they seemed to have
"solved" those problems of American capitalism that seemed so disas-
trous in the thirties. In reality, the solution was only a pallia-
tive. Under the tranquil surface of prosperity the fundamental dil-
emmas persisted and in the end proved to have created new problems
in addition to the old.69
The policy of economic expansion embodied contradictory ten-
dencies: a tendency to absorb American products by creating markets
and a tendency to arouse opposition overseas which caused, deriva-
tively, other political and economic problems at home and abroad.
In Vietnam, the second tendency came decisively to the fore.
The military establishment is not simply an exercise in job
creation after all. American economic dominance could never have
been maintained by purely "peaceful" means like subsidies to conser-
vative foreign politicians (as in Italy) or sponsorship of military
coups (Guatemala, Iran, Chile, etc.). As a result, for more than a
generation, the United States has maintained garrisons around the
world. This vast military presence has been fairly successful. On
the other hand, the victory in Vietnam showed that the Washington
government and the corporate elite cannot afford many failures.
The Vietnam War was a logical consequence of a long-standing
policy: 1) no part of the world would be abandoned which was open
to domination by American commercial interests, and, 2) almost any
area could be a potential market for American corporations. In fact,
foreign sales grew more rapidly from 1950 to 1965 than sales in the
more easily saturated domestic market.70 The policy did not, of
course, necessarily correspond to the particular needs of specific
corporations, in each instance, but it did (and still does) reflect
the general interests of the monopoly sector. The war increased
military expenses, but its unpopularity meant that the Johnson regime
dared not defray them with heavy taxes and austerity (as in World
War II). Instead the Federal deficit grew from $1.6 billion in 1965
to $25.2 billion in 1968. 71 War production reduced unemployment to
3.5% in 1969, 72 greatly increasing labor's bargaining power. Follow-
ing the lead of the unionized, workers in general raised their incomes
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almost fast enough to keep up with inflation. American products, at
inflated prices, could not compete well with those of other countries
and in 1971, for the first time in the century, the United States im-
ported more than it exported.73 This decline in American economic
hegemony and the loss of foreign markets threatened the whole policy
of economic expansion which had helped "end" the crisis of the thir-
ties. From 1965 to 1970 corporate profits (i.e., money capital) had
declined by 10.6%.74 From the corporate standpoint this situation
was a disaster. It was the basis of the crisis in capital formation
of today.
The American economy, a vast structure erected on shaky founda-
tions, continues to confound its managers. Presidents Nixon and Ford
saw inflation as the crucial enemy. They devalued the dollar to make
the United States more competitive internationally, cut labor costs
with a wage freeze and did little to relieve the most serious recess-
ion in forty years. Banks and corporations, with help from politic-
ians of both parties, have used the New York City fiscal crisis to
scare the citizens into accepting reduced levels of government serv-
ices and permitting wealth to flow to the major commercial and finan-
cial centers. The elite is especially persistent in pursuit of this
capital because nearly all large corporations are deeply in debt and
most banks have abandoned sound business principles and ordinary
common sense in makina loans. They have built a precarious network
of obligations in which a failure of any one participant coulO, at
least in theory, preciritate a general collapse with bank failures,
corporate bankruptcies, and other horrors.75
There is a traditional myth which holds that businessmen, con-
cerned with the stern realities of the world, are necessarily hard-
headed and practical. without much thinking about it, many of us
still tend to assume that if these pragmatists think there is a capi-
tal shortage then there must be a capital shortage. If they and
their economic experts say it exists because of our "profligacy" and
must be relieved at our exnense, we feel unset but do not oresume to
question their expertise.
As we have seen, there really is a shortage of money capital
(not of other kinds though -- inventories are quite high at rresent)
but it exists as an unintended consequence of policies designed to
save business from the irresistible need of an unplanned, profit-
oriented economy to produce more goods than the neople can buy.
Business is in a serious dilemma and the corporate pragmatists want
the majority of Americans to sacrifice in order to get them out of
trouble. It would be possible, of course, to resolve the crisis at
their expense and not at the expense of the poor and working people.
Various solutions are possible. The choice between them is a
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political question.
The capital crisis and the development of the subproletariat,
pose a serious threat to social welfare. Unable to regulate the sub-
proletariat as it has traditionally disciplined the labor force, social
welfare is correspondingly less useful to both the corporate elites.
The leaders of the monopoly sector increasingly employ the hackneyed
anti-relief rhetoric of the competitive sector elites. The capital
crisis gives an urgency to their denunciations.
The American political economy has evolved, in recent decades,
in a way that has destroyed the necessary conditions for existence of
the corporate liberal alliance for social welfare. Social welfare's
partisans must develop a completely new approach, based on the con-
crete realities of today, in their fight to preserve and extend serv-
ices.
Part IV, Towards A Renewal of Social Welfare
The struggle for social welfare will have to be consciously
political, and in unprecedented ways. Social welfare partisans must
learn to recognize enemies as well as friends and to see political
issues as questions of power. Since the traditional supporters in
the business elite are unreliably friendly at best, social welfare
must have a mass base of support in other areas of the population,
among that great majority of Americans whose interests are funda-
mentally opposed to those of the elite. This means, of course, that
social welfare must abandon the stance of the "expert" who is above
politics, a relic from the heyday of corporate liberalism. In real-
ity, social welfare's work has always had political implications and
it was only the nearly total hegemony of the monopoly sector corpor-
ate elite which made it possible for that stratum's chosen policies
to appear as the only conceivable products of science and intellect.
Nowadays social welfare can only advance if it makes a clear
political commitment and follows a general strategic plan as part
of a popular anti-corporate movement.
This proposition can only seem abstract at present. The
majority of working people are fragmented and discouraged, divided
very frequently around issues of social welfare itself, with relief
the supposed object of mass hostility. It is entirely possible,
however, that the opposition which many public opinion polls purport
to demonstrate is an opposition to the cost of services rather than
to the services themselves. In view of the staggering burden of pre-
vailing taxation, this attitude is perfectly comprehensible. In the
absence of any credible political force pushing for a thoroughgoing
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reform of state finance and a redistribution of wealth, the average
voter has little choice but to accept the fiscal stringency on which
most of the significant centers of power in the U.S. seem to have
agreed. Insofar as working people do oppose social welfare, it is
probably because they see it as a set of programs for the subproletar-
iat, a stratum they often resent as parasitic. Their feelings have
a certain basis in reality -- the subproletarian poor do live off
wealth produced by others, and the social services they use do tend
to be separate from those used by the working class. Of course, it is
not their fault that they have been excluded from the workforce and
live off public assistance rather than wages, salaries, or unemploy-
ment insurance benefits. The fact remains, though, that the organi-
zation of social welfare reflects the division between these two
social strata.
Working people need social services too, of course, and have
fought hard for some of them, especially daycare and some ancillary
services in medical and educational settings. These struggles have
been difficult in recent years as the pressure of the capital crisis
has intensified. The difficulties are increased by social welfare's
subproletarian stigma.
On the other hand, there are programs which are entirely
respectable because they are clearly established to help less for-
tunate members of the workforce. Social security and unemployment
insurance are examples.
This fragmentation of both the social services and their
political base is a serious source of divisiveness and weakness. The
first task for partisans of social welfare is to overcome this dis-
unity. It is possible that the blurring mentioned earlier of the
distinction between subproletarians and unemployed workers may play
a salutary role. In addition the partisans must propose policy
changes to break down the distinction between the two types of pro-
grams. Some examples are the funding of Old Age and Survivors Dis-
ability and Health Insurance out of general revenue, the retention of
the food stamp program for a wide stratum of workinq people, and a
broad range of non-financial services under Title XX of the Social
Security Act for both relief recipients and those who are better off.
The Social Security tax is regressive and a burden. In addi-
tion it seems insufficient to guarantee the program's long-range sol-
vency.76 Funding OASDHI out of general revenue raised by a supposedly
progressive income tax would be an improvement in principle. More
importantly, it would mean an abandonment of the insurance concept and
convert OASDHI into a relief program, a relief program, however, with
enormous popular support. Such a transformation of social security
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would begin to undermine the pariah status of public assistance.
The unifying character of the broad food stamp and Title xx
programs is obvious. It might be argued, of course, that a more
narrowly focused effort would result in a better service for those
most in need. As an abstract argument, this is true enough but
in practice we must recognize that a narrowly focused program has
a correspondingly narrow basis of popular support and is thus more
subject to scapegoating and funding cutbacks. To demonstrate this
one need only compare the relative popularities of public assistance
and OASDHI. The possible changes in policy begin to address the ques-
tion of how a new mass base for social welfare can be formed. They
do not, however, speak to the question of funding and the crisis of
capital formation. How can funding for social welfare be increased?
A partial answer lies in a thorough revision of governmental
spending priorities, a turning away from militarism. It is not
enough, however, to propose, for example, that the Pentagon forego
two Bl bombers so that social service funding may be augmented by
equivalent billions. What is needed instead is a thorough plan for
demilitarization of the entire economy.
Discontent with militarism is a constant undercurrent in
American political consciousness, although no established political
tendency articulates it forcefully. Still, the Cold War could only
be instituted after a systematic effort to delude and terrorize the
American populace 77 who, even so, voted for what claimed to be
peace candidates in 1952, 1964, 1968, and 1972. Opposition to
militarism arouses the fury of red-baiting conservatives and the
occasional support of certain liberals, who timidly propose marginal
reductions in military procurement. The liberals have a long history
of losing such arguments, mostly because their position is based on
nothing more than a series of quibbles about the relative strength
of Soviet vis-a-vis American military might. They do not challenge
the purposes of militarism. Obviously, liberal anti-militarism,
having conceded basic premises to the right, can only be feeble and
tentative. A genuine anti-militarism, by contrast, must forthrightly
attack militarism's premises. The Vietnamese fiasco has substanti-
ally discredited the idea of the United States-as world-policeman.
And the view of military spending as a creator of jobs is rapidly
losing its basis in reality.
Military spending tends to create jobs. Its defenders always
emphasize this fact. But they ignore another, paradoxical reality:
that it also tends to eliminate jobs. In earlier years the first
tendency prevailed, but recently the second has become increasingly
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dominant. The constant effort to maintain military superiority
over the USSR requires ever more technologically sophisticated arma-
ments. More sophisticated weaponry implies more technologically
advanced industries to build it, industries requiring a more skilled
and less numerous workforce. Military spendina thus fosters tech-
nological unemployment and compounds the problem created by sluggish
growth in the number of low-skill jobs. The harm military spending
does to the job market has recently been documented in a study which
shows the differences in the number of jobs resulting from $1 billion
of federal expenditure in the military as opposed to several other
areas.78
In addition, military production, by failing to either meet
consumers' needs, or produce equipment other manufacturers could use
to meet them, does not generate as many jobs as civilian production.
In fact, military production's products are either used up (i.e.,
destroyed), or become obsolete and get scrapped without ever being
employed. Either way they are wasted without producing economic
wealth that human beings could use.
Opponents of militarism are clearly in a position to make strong
appeals to the self-interest of most Americans. Although the Viet-
namese victory removed the immediate impetus for public debate on
militarism, it is probable that a vague comprehension of these facts
lies at the root of the considerable (though partly latent) distrust
of the military which persists despite the jingoism of many politi-
cians and the mass media.79 There are grounds for cautious optimism,
at least, in thinking that a coherent plan for conversion of the
economy away from militarism could win many adherents. Certainly,
it would have a more beneficial effect on inflation and unemployment
than anything anyone else has suggested. And since militarism is
mainly a mechanism for the care and feeding of corporations, a poli-
tical effort against militarism is necessarily part of the growing
anti-corporate movement.
Supporters of social welfare must attach themselves to the
broad progressive coalition which is gradually evolving in opposit-
ion to the corporate attack on the American people. Some workers
will disagree, arguing that they should continue in their traditional
role as "dispassionate experts" trying to solve the problems of soci-
ety. That role was somewhat relevant in the earlier years of the
liberal corporate state. Unfortunately, that role was based on the
willingness of the corporate elite of the monopoly sector to sponsor
efforts at social amelioration -- the nicer side of regulating the
workforce, legitimation. With the advent of the subproletariat,
the custodial function, and the capital crisis, the elite is less
friendly. The social welfare expert has less to offer them than
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before. The corporate liberal order is crumbling.
If social welfare is to survive it must become part of a new
force, the independent movement of the American people toward peace
and prosperity. Social welfare need not go as a supplicant -- it has
much to offer in training, experience, and program -- but it is a
truism that social welfare needs friends and this is the only possi-
bility.80
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